The model has the following assumptions: There are at least two firms producing homogeneous products; Firms do not cooperate; Firms have the same marginal cost (MC); Marginal cost is constant; Demand is linear; Firms compete in price, and choose their respective prices simultaneously; There is strategic behaviour by both firms; Both firms compete solely on price and then supply the quantity demanded; Consumers buy everything from the cheaper firm or half at each, if the price is equal. Competing in price means that firms can easily change the quantity they supply, but once they have chosen a certain price, it is very hard, if not impossible, to change it, for example bars or shops or other companies that publish non-negotiable prices.
Calculating the classic Bertrand model MC = Marginal cost p1 = firm 1's price level p2 = firm 2's price level pM = monopoly price level Firm 1s optimum price depends on what it believes firm 2 will set prices at. Pricing just below the other firm will obtain full market demand (D), while maximizing profits. If firm 1 expects firm 2 to price below marginal cost, then its best strategy is to price higher, at marginal cost. In general terms, firm 1s best response function is p1''(p2), this gives firm 1 optimal price for each price set by firm 2.
Diagram 1 shows firm 1's reaction function p1''(p2), with each firms strategy on each axis. It shows that when P2 is less than marginal cost (firm 2 pricing below MC) firm 1 prices at marginal cost, p1=MC. When firm 2 prices above MC but below monopoly prices, then firm 1 prices just below firm 2. When firm 2 prices above monopoly prices (PM) firm 1 prices at monopoly level, p1=pM. Because firm 2 has the same marginal cost as firm 1, its reaction function is symmetrical with respect to the 45 degree line. Diagram 2 shows both reaction functions.
The result of the firms strategies is a Nash equilibrium, that is, a pair of strategies (prices in this case) where neither firm can increase profits by unilaterally changing price. This is given by the intersection of the reaction curves, Point N on the diagram. At this point p1=p1''(p2), and p2=p2''(p1). As you can see, point N on the diagram is where both firms are pricing at marginal cost. Another way of thinking about it, a simpler way, is to imagine if both firms set equal prices above marginal cost, firms would get half the market at a higher than MC price. However, by lowering prices just slightly, a firm could gain the whole market, so both firms are tempted to lower prices as much as they can. It would be irrational to price below marginal cost, because the firm would make a loss. Therefore, both firms will lower prices until they reach the MC limit. Implications There are two plausible outcomes: colluding to charge the monopoly price and supplying one half of the market each, or not colluding and charging marginal cost, which is the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium outcome. If one firm has lower average cost (a superior production technology), it will charge the highest price that is lower than the average cost of the other one (i.e. a price just below the lowest price the other firm can manage) and take all the business. This is known as "limit pricing" Bertrand competition versus Cournot competition Although both models have similar assumptions, both have very different implications.
Bertrand predicts a duopoly is enough to push prices down to marginal cost level, that duopoly will result in perfect competition. Neither model is necessarily "better". The accuracy of the predictions of each model will vary from industry to industry, depending on the closeness of each model to the industry situation. If capacity and output can be easily changed, Bertrand is generally a better model of duopoly competition. Or, if output and capacity are difficult to adjust, then Cournot is generally a better model. Under some conditions the Cournot model can be recast as a two stage model, where in the first stage firms choose capacities, and in the second they compete in Bertrand fashion.
Critical analysis of the Bertrand model
The most critical flaw of the model is the assumption that firms compete in one period, the price being chosen and set for ever. However, as it is unreasonable to expect the other firm to indefinitely keep higher prices and sell nothing, each firm must expect that lowering the price will almost immediately be met with the same move by the other firm, thus no firm can expect to get bigger market share by cutting price, and the preferred strategy is keeping prices at monopoly price level. The situation is analogous to the prisoner's dilemma, single-period version of which has completely opposite implications than the iterated version. Examining the assumptions reveals some inadequacies of the model: it assumes firms compete purely on price, ignoring non-price competition. Firms can differentiate their products and charge a higher price. For example, would someone travel twice as far to save 1% on the price of their vegetables? There are rarely just two firms in a market. If a firm does undercut a rival and get full market share, it now has to supply the whole market; many firms would not have the capacity to do this. In general, the greater the overall capacity constraints, the higher the price is than marginal cost.
Cournot competition
Cournot competition is an economic model used to describe industry structure. It so called after Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) after he observed competition in a spring water duopoly. It has the following features: There is more than one firm and all firms produce a homogeneous product; Firms do not cooperate. Firms have market power; The number of firms is fixed; Firms compete in quantities, and choose quantities simultaneously; There is strategic behaviour by the firms; An essential assumption of this model is that each firm aims to maximize profits, based on the expectation that its own output decision will not have an effect on the decisions of its rivals. Price is a commonly known decreasing function of total output. All firms know N, the total number of firms in the market, and take the output of the others as given. Each firm has a cost function ci(qi). Normally the cost functions are treated as common knowledge. The cost functions may be the same or different among firms. The market price is set at a level such that demand equals the total quantity produced by both firms. Each firm takes the quantity set by its competitors as a given, evaluates its residual demand, and then behaves as a monopoly. Graphically finding the Cournot duopoly equilibrium This section presents an analysis of the model with 2 firms and constant marginal cost. p1 = firm 1 price, p2 = firm 2 price q1 = firm 1 quantity, q2 = firm 2 quantity c = marginal cost, identical for both firms Equilibrium prices will be: p1 = p2 = P(q1 + q2) This implies that firm 1's profit is given by Calculate firm 1's residual demand: Suppose firm 1 believes firm 2 is producing quantity q2. What is firm 1's optimal quantity? Consider the diagram 1. If firm 1 decides not to produce anything, then price is given by P(0+q2)=P(q2). If firm 1 sets produces q1' then price is given by P(q1'+q2). More generally, for each quantity that firm 1 might decide to set, price is given by the curve d1(q2). The curve d1(q2) is called firm 1's residual demand; it gives all possible combinations of firm 1's quantity and price for a given value of q2. Determine firm 1's optimum output: To do this we must find where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Marginal cost (c) is assumed to be constant. Marginal revenue is a curve -r1(q2) -with twice the slope of d1(q2) and with the same vertical intercept. The point at which the two curves (c and r1(q2)) intersect corresponds to quantity q1''(q2). Firm 1's optimum q1''(q2), depends on what it believes firm 2 is doing. To find an equilibrium, we derive firm 1's optimum for other possible values of q2. Diagram 2 considers two possible values of q2. If q2=0, then the first firm's residual demand is effectively the market demand, d1(0)=D. The optimal solution is for firm 1 to choose the monopoly quantity; q1''(0)=qm (qm is monopoly quantity). If firm 2 were to choose the quantity corresponding to perfect competition, q2=qc P(qc)=c, then firm 1's optimum would be to produce nil: q1''(qc)=0. This is the point at which marginal cost intercepts the marginal revenue corresponding to d1(qc).
It can be shown that, given the linear demand and constant marginal cost, the function q1''(q2) is also linear. Because we have two points, we can draw the entire function q1''(q2), see diagram 3. Note the axis of the graphs has changed, The function q1''(q2) is firm 1's reaction function, it gives firm 1's optimal choice for each possible choice by firm 2. In other words, it gives firm 1's choice given what it believes firm 2 is doing.
The last stage in finding the Cournot equilibrium is to find firm 2's reaction function. In this case it is symmetrical to firm 1's as they have the same cost function. The equilibrium is the interception point of the reaction curves. See diagram 4.
The prediction of the model is that the firms will choose Nash equilibrium output levels. Calculating the equilibrium In very general terms, let the price function for the (duopoly) industry be P(q1 + q2) and firm i have the cost structure Ci(qi). To calculate the Nash equilibrium, the best response functions of the firms must first be calculated.
The profit of firm i is revenue minus cost. Revenue is the product of price and quantity and cost is given by the firm's cost function, so profit is (as described above):
. The best response is to find the value of qi that maximises given qj, with , i.e. given some output of the opponent firm, the output that maximises profit is found. Hence, the maximum of with respect to qi is to be found. First derive with respect to qi:
Setting this to zero for maximisation:
The values of qi that satisfy this equation are the best responses. The Nash equilibria are where both q1 and q2 are best responses given those values of q1 and q2. An example Suppose the industry has the following price structure:
The profit of firm i (with cost structure Ci(qi) such that and for ease of computation) is:
The maximisation problem resolves to (from the general case):
Without loss of generality, consider firm 1's problem:
By symmetry:
These are the firms' best response functions. For any value of q2, firm 1 responds best with any value of q1 that satisfies the above. In Nash equilibria, both firms will be playing best responses so solving the above equations simultaneously. Substituting for q2 in firm 1's best response:
The Nash equilibrium is at (q1 * ,q2 * ). Making suitable assumptions for the partial derivatives (for example, assuming each firm's cost is a linear function of quantity and thus using the slope of that function in the calculation), the equilibrium quantities can be substituted in the assumed industry price structure P(q1 + q2) = a − b(q1 + q2) to obtain the equilibrium market price.
[edit] Cournot competition with many firms and the Cournot Theorem For an arbitrary number of firms, N>1, the quantities and price can be derived in a manner analogous to that given above. With linear demand and identical, constant marginal cost the equilibrium values are as follows:
which is each individual firm's output which is total industry output and is the market clearing price. The Cournot Theorem then states that as the number of firms in the market, N, goes to infinity, market output, Nq, goes to the competitive level and the price converges to marginal cost.
Hence with many firms a Cournot market approximates a perfectly competitive market. This result can be generalized to the case of firms with different cost structures (under appropriate restrictions) and non-linear demand. Implications Output is greater with Cournot duopoly than monopoly, but lower than perfect competition. Price is lower with Cournot duopoly than monopoly, but not as low as with perfect competition.
Bertrand versus Cournot
Although both models have similar assumptions, they have very different implications: Bertrand predicts a duopoly is enough to push prices down to marginal cost level, meaning that a duopoly will result in perfect competition. Neither model is necessarily "better". The accuracy of the predictions of each model will vary from industry to industry, depending on the closeness of each model to the industry situation.
If capacity and output can be easily changed, Bertrand is a better model of duopoly competition. If output and capacity are difficult to adjust, then Cournot is generally a better model. Under some conditions the Cournot model can be recast as a two stage model, where in the first stage firms choose capacities, and in the second they compete in Bertrand fashion.
Stackelberg versus Cournot
The Stackelberg and Cournot models are similar because in both, competition is on quantity. The first move gives the leader in Stackelberg a crucial advantage. There is also the important assumption of perfect information in the Stackelberg game: the follower must observe the quantity chosen by the leader, otherwise the game reduces to Cournot. This is an example of too much information hurting a player. In Cournot competition, it is the simultaneity of the game (the imperfection of knowledge) that results in neither player (ceteris paribus) being at a disadvantage.
Stackelberg competition
The Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in economics in which the leader firm moves first and then the follower firms move sequentially. It is named after the German economist Heinrich von Stackelberg who published Marktform und Gleichgewicht in 1934 which described the model. In game theory terms, the players of this game are a leader and a follower and they compete on quantity. The leader moves first, choosing a quantity. The follower observes the leader's choice and then picks a quantity. The Stackelberg leader is sometimes referred to as the Market Leader. There are some further constraints upon the sustaining of a Stackelberg equilibrium. The leader must know ex ante that the follower observes his action. The follower must have no means of committing to a future non-Stackelberg follower action and the leader must know this. Indeed, if the 'follower' could commit to a Stackelberg leader action and the 'leader' knew this, the leader's best response would be to play a Stackelberg follower action. Firms may engage in Stackelberg competition if one has some sort of advantage enabling it to move first. More generally, the leader must have commitment power. Moving observably first is the most obvious means of commitment: once the leader has made its move, it cannot undo it -it is committed to that action. Moving first may be possible if the leader was the incumbent monopoly of the industry and the follower is a new entrant. Holding excess capacity is another means of commitment.
Nash equilibrium
The Stackelberg model can be solved to find the Nash equilibrium (or possibly equilibria), i.e. the strategy profile that serves best each player, given the strategies of the other player. In very general terms, let the price function for the (duopoly) industry be P(q1 + q2) where the subscript 1 represents the leader and 2 represents the follower. Price is simply a function of total (industry) output. Suppose firm i has the cost structure Ci(qi). The model is solved by backward induction. The leader considers what the best response of the follower is, i.e. how it will respond once it has observed the quantity of the leader. The leader then picks a quantity that is a best response to the predicted response of the follower. The follower actually observes this and in equilibrium picks the expected quantity as a response. To calculate the Nash equilibrium, the best response functions of the follower must first be calculated (calculation moves 'backwards' because of backward induction). The profit of firm 2 (the follower) is revenue less cost. Revenue is the product of price and quantity and cost is given by the firm's cost structure, so profit is: Π2 = P(q1 + q2).q2 − C2(q2). The best response is to find the value of q2 that maximises Π2 given q1, i.e. given the output of the leader (firm 1), the output that maximises the follower's profit is found. Hence, the maximum of Π2 with respect to q2 is to be found. First derive Π2 with respect to q2: Setting this to zero for maximisation:
The values of q2 that satisfy this equation are the best responses. Now the best response function of the leader is considered. This function is calculated by considering the follower's output as a function of the leader's output, as just computed.
The profit of firm 1 (the leader) is: Π1 = P(q1 + q2(q1)).q1 − C1(q1), where q2(q1) is the follower's quantity as a function of quantity, namely the function calculated above. The best response is to find the value of q1 that maximises Π1 given q2(q1), i.e. given the best response function of the follower (firm 2), the output that maximises the leader's profit is found. Hence, the maximum of Π1 with respect to q1 is to be found. First derive Π1 with respect to q1: Setting this to zero for maximisation:
and firms have cost structures Ci(qi) such that and for ease of computation. The follower's profit is:
Consider the leader's problem:
Substituting for q2(q1) from the follower's problem:
Now solving for q1 yields , the leader's optimal action: This is the leader's best response to the reaction of the follower in equilibrium. The follower's actual can now be found by feeding this into its reaction function calculated earlier:
The Nash equilibria are all . It is clear (if marginal costs are assumed to be zero -i.e. cost is essentially ignored) that the leader has a significant advantage. Intuitively, if the leader was no better off than the follower, it would simply adopt a Cournot competition strategy. Economic Analysis An extensive-form representation is often used to analyse the Stackelberg leaderfollower model. Also referred to as a "decision tree", the model shows the combination of outputs and payoffs both firms have in the Stackelberg game A Stackelberg game represented in extensive form The image on the left depicts in extensive form a Stackelberg game. The payoffs are shown on the right. This example is fairly simple. There is a basic cost structure involving only marginal cost (there is no fixed cost). The demand function is linear and price elasticity of demand is 1. However, it illustrates the leader's advantage. The follower wants to choose q2 to maximise its payoff 5000 − q1 − q2 − c2. Taking the first order derivative and equating it to zero (for maximisation) yields as the maximum value of q2. The leader wants to choose q1 to maximise its payoff 5000 − q1 − q2 − c1. However, in equilibrium, it knows the follower will choose q2 as above. So in fact the leader wants to maximise its payoff (by substituting q2 for the follower's best response function). By differentiation, the maximum payoff is given by . Feeding this into the follower's best response function yields . Suppose marginal costs were equal for the firms (so the leader has no market advantage other than first move) and in particular c1 = c2 = 1000. The leader would produce 2000 and the follower would produce 1000. This would give the leader a profit (payoff) of two million and the follower a profit of one million. Simply by moving first, the leader has accrued twice the profit of the follower. However, Cournot profits here are 1.78 (in fact one and seven ninths) million a piece, so the leader has not gained much, but the follower has lost. However, this is example-specific. There may be cases where a Stackelberg leader has huge gains beyond Cournot profit that approach monopoly profits (for example, if the leader also had a large cost structure advantage, perhaps due to a better production function). There may also be cases where the follower actually enjoys higher profits than the leader, but only because it, say, has much lower costs. Noncredible threats by the follower If, after the leader had selected its equilibrium quantity, the follower deviated from the equilibrium and chose some non-optimal quantity it would not only hurt itself, but it could also hurt the leader. If the follower chose a much larger quantity than its best response, the market price would lower and the leader's profits would be stung, perhaps below Cournot level profits. In this case, the follower could announce to the leader before the game starts that unless the leader chooses a Cournot equilibrium quantity, the follower will choose a deviant quantity that will hit the leader's profits. After all, the quantity chosen by the leader in equilibrium is only optimal if the follower also plays in equilibrium. The leader is, however, in no danger. Once the leader has chosen its equilibrium quantity, it would be irrational for the follower to deviate because it too would be hurt. Once the leader has chosen, the follower is better off by playing on the equilibrium path. Hence, such a threat by the follower would be incredible. However, in an (indefinitely) repeated Stackelberg game, the follower might adopt a punishment strategy where it threatens to punish the leader in the next period unless it chooses a non-optimal strategy in the current period. This threat is credible because it would be rational for the follower to punish in the next period so that the leader chooses Cournot quantities thereafter. Stackelberg compared to Cournot The Stackelberg and Cournot models are similar because in both competition is on quantity. However, as seen, the first move gives the leader in Stackelberg a crucial advantage. There is also the important assumption of perfect information in the Stackelberg game: the follower must observe the quantity chosen by the leader, otherwise the game reduces to Cournot. With imperfect information, the threats described above can be credible. If the follower cannot observe the leader's move, it is no longer irrational for the follower to choose, say, a Cournot level of quantity (in fact, that is the equilibrium action). However, it must be that there is imperfect information and the follower is unable to observe the leader's move because it is irrational for the follower not to observe if it can once the leader has moved. If it can observe, it will so that it can make the optimal decision. Any threat by the follower claiming that it will not observe even if it can is as incredible as those above. This is an example of too much information hurting a player. In Cournot competition, it is the simultaneity of the game (the imperfection of knowledge) that results in neither player (ceteris paribus) being at a disadvantage. Game theoretic considerations As mentioned, imperfect information in a leadership game reduces to Cournot competition. However, some Cournot strategy profiles are sustained as Nash equilibria but can be eliminated as incredible threats (as described above) by applying the solution concept of subgame perfection. Indeed, it is the very thing that makes a Cournot strategy profile a Nash equilibrium in a Stackelberg game that prevents it from being subgame perfect. Consider a Stackelberg game (i.e. one which fulfils the requirements described above for sustaining a Stackelberg equilibrium) in which, for some reason, the leader believes that whatever action it takes, the follower will choose a Cournot quantity (perhaps the leader believes that the follower is irrational). If the leader played a Stackelberg action, (it believes) that the follower will play Cournot. Hence it is nonoptimal for the leader to play Stackelberg. In fact, its best response (by the definition of Cournot equilibria) is to play Cournot quantity. Once it has done this, the best response of the follower is to play Cournot. Consider the following strategy profiles: the leader plays Cournot; the follower plays Cournot if the leader plays Cournot and the follower plays non-Stackelberg if the leader plays Stackelberg and if the leader plays something else, the follower plays an arbitrary strategy (hence this actually describes several profiles). This profile is a Nash equilibrium. As argued above, on the equilibrium path play is a best response to a best response. However, playing Cournot would not have been the best response of the leader were it that the follower would play Stackelberg if it (the leader) played Stackelberg. In this case, the best response of the leader would be to play Stackelberg. Hence, what makes this profile (or rather, these profiles) a Nash equilibrium (or rather, Nash equilibria) is the fact that the follower would play non-Stackelberg if the leader were to play Stackelberg. However, this very fact (that the follower would play non-Stackelberg if the leader were to play Stackelberg) means that this profile is not a Nash equilibrium of the subgame starting when the leader has already played Stackelberg (a subgame off the equilibrium path). If the leader has already played Stackelberg, the best response of the follower is to play Stackelberg (and therefore it is the only action that yields a Nash equilibrium in this subgame). Hence the strategy profile -which is Cournot -is not subgame perfect.
Comparison with other oligopoly models In comparison with other oligopoly models, The aggregate Stackelberg output is greater than the aggregate Cournot output, but less than the aggregate Bertrand output. The Stackelberg price is lower than the Cournot price, but greater than the Bertrand price. The Stackelberg consumer surplus is greater than the Cournot consumer surplus, but lower than the Bertrand consumer surplus. The aggregate Stackelberg output is greater than pure monopoly or cartel, but less than the perfectly competitive output. The Stackelberg price is lower than the pure monopoly or cartel price, but greater than the perfectly competitive price.
